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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Just over thirty years ago, I was a student in Kenneth Culp Davis’s 
class in Administrative Law at the University of Chicago Law School.  
Davis’s casebook and teaching style exemplified an approach that many 
law professors of today would consider too didactic.  Every chapter of 
the book offered generous servings of Davis’s own teachings, along with 
queries that could only be described as leading questions.1  In class, too, 
 *  Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis.  I 
appreciate helpful comments received from Christopher Bracey, Kathleen Brickey, 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reuel Schiller, Peter L. Strauss, and participants in the Third 
Administrative Law Discussion Forum held at the University of San Diego School of 
Law on May 1, 2004. 
 1. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-




there was seldom any suspense about the direction in which Davis was 
going to steer the discussion.  A student who was unprepared to respond 
to a question posed to him or her could regularly expect to hear Davis 
point out where the answer could be found: “It’s in the book!” 
And yet, no matter how freely students parodied his classroom style in 
private, Davis attracted large enrollments in Administrative Law.  Why 
did practically every student at Chicago in the early 1970s regard this 
elective as a must-take course?  A large part of the answer, I think, is 
that they realized that in this course they were in the presence of a true 
Authority.  In every chapter of his casebook, and on every day of class, 
Davis left no doubts about his passionate conviction that the challenges 
of inducing agencies to perform their functions fairly and effectively 
were important, and that he had a host of worthwhile ideas about 
possible solutions to those problems.  So what if many of the cases 
excerpted in the casebook contained references to the teachings of 
Kenneth Culp Davis?  Many of them were, after all, leading cases.  Such 
was the formidable reputation that this professor possessed, and we 
knew it. 
Davis passed away in September 2003, and this commemorative Essay 
seeks to take stock of his legacy.  I can still recall Davis’s commanding 
presence at the lectern, and some of his favorite phrases have stayed with 
me, such as his prescriptions for control of agency discretion: “Open rules!  
Open standards!  Open findings!  Open precedents!”  After thirty years’ 
time, however, I am scarcely in the best position to write a memoir of 
Davis as a teacher.  Similarly, because I had little contact with him after 
law school, others can more reliably reminisce about him as an academic 
colleague.2  Instead, my principal task in this Essay is to survey and 
assess Davis’s scholarly contributions to administrative law. 
PROBLEMS 42 (5th ed. 1973) (“Do you think that one basic need of the non-delegation 
doctrine in the state courts is for further spread of the movement toward emphasizing 
safeguards instead of standards?”); id. at 473 (“Do you get the uneasy feeling that the 
quality of justice for the aliens in the Santos and Jarecha cases may be inferior to the 
quality of justice for the businesses in the Crowther and Greater Boston cases?”). 
 2. See In Memoriam: Kenneth Culp Davis, 29 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 
2003, at 2 (an obituary that includes biographical information as well as colleagues’ 
perceptions).  Paul Verkuil once related that his first article on administrative law elicited 
from Davis “a five page single-spaced letter that made me wonder whether I had chosen 
the right field.”  He called Davis’s forceful critique “a high compliment” and “a rite of 
passage for young scholars in the field.”  K.C. Davis & Walter Gellhorn, Present at the 
Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 511 (1986) (panel 
discussion remarks).  Although I cannot generalize, a letter that I received from Davis 
about one of my early projects for the American Bar Association supports Verkuil’s 
account.  The following excerpt aptly captures the thrust of the letter: “Your project is a 
worthy one, and you have carried it out very well, but I think that all of us have to 
conclude that the final product would do much more harm than good.”  Letter from 
Kenneth Culp Davis, to Ronald M. Levin (Apr. 10, 1985) (on file with author). 
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That task is daunting enough!  My treatment here will be highly 
selective.  How could it be otherwise?  Davis’s contributions are too 
manifold to fit within the short confines of this Essay.3  I feel a bit as 
though I had been asked to sum up “the contributions of Sigmund Freud 
to psychoanalysis.”  If I cannot provide a full intellectual biography, 
however, I can at least record some highlights of a most distinguished 
career.  The passage of more than a decade since Davis withdrew from 
active scholarship allows me to aim for a degree of critical perspective.  
The world has embraced some of Davis’s ideas and spurned others.  I 
will comment on some of each.  I will then conclude with some short 
reflections on what this mixed record tells us about the evolution of 
contemporary thinking about administrative law. 
II.  THE AUTHORITY 
Although the subject of “administrative law” was familiar well before 
Davis entered the scene,4 his 1951 book on the subject5 was the first 
systematic exposition of the field.  He then expanded that work into a 
much more comprehensive four-volume treatise in 1958.6  With Davis’s 
capacity for broad research, incisive analysis, and moral passion on full 
display, the treatise immediately overshadowed all prior work in the 
area.7
The longtime preeminence of Davis’s treatise and other writings in the 
administrative law firmament is, perhaps, difficult to appreciate today.  
 3. See Writings of Kenneth Culp Davis, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3–5 (1976) (a 
bibliography of Davis’s writings, as of the time of his retirement from the Chicago 
faculty). 
 4. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 
614, 615–16 (1927) (noting that “the term has now established itself in the vocabulary of 
the United States Supreme Court” and “[h]ardly a volume of bar association proceedings 
is now without some reference to this phenomenon”). 
 5. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1951). 
 6. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1st ed. 1958).  The 
second edition was published on a staggered schedule: volume 1 in 1978, volume 2 in 
1979, volume 3 in 1980, volume 4 in 1983, and volume 5 in 1984.  Hardcover 
supplements were published in 1970, 1976, and 1989.  (The 1976 supplement carried the 
catchy title “Administrative Law of the Seventies.”)  Citations to TREATISE in this Essay 
refer to the second edition, except where otherwise specified. 
 7. In a book review of the first two volumes of the second edition of the Davis 
treatise, Judge Henry Friendly warmly praised the contributions of some two dozen of 
the leading administrative law scholars of the mid-twentieth century, but identified Davis 
as the “unquestioned leader” of the group.  Henry J. Friendly, Book Review, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1980). 




Often the Supreme Court not only cited to Davis’s work, but seemed to 
take shelter in his reputation as a way of validating its assertions.8  In the 
lower courts, where high-volume caseloads naturally put a premium on 
the ready availability of a handy reference work, his influence has been 
even more pronounced.9  Following Davis’s retirement from scholarship, 
the treatise has been revised and maintained, ably and diligently, by his 
coauthor and successor, Richard J. Pierce, Jr.10  It is still the most 
frequently cited work in the field.  Over the years, however, other works 
on administrative law have proliferated, and thus the once-dominant 
position of the Davis treatise will likely never be equaled. 
An example of Davis’s leadership about which I have firsthand 
knowledge was his early writing about the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).11  Enacted in 1966, FOIA was a major overhaul of the relatively 
obscure provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) on 
disclosure of government information.  The new statute rested on the 
then-novel premise that any document in the government’s possession 
should be available to every member of the public upon request, unless it 
fell within any of nine statutory exemptions.  The relatively brief text of 
FOIA invited numerous controversies, particularly about the scope of the 
nine exemptions.  Davis responded quickly.  In an article published in 
1967, he surveyed numerous issues of construction that had arisen or 
would likely arise in the administration of the Act.12  Today, of course, 
the literature on FOIA has burgeoned, and entire multivolume treatises 
have been written about the complexities posed by the Act (and 
subsequent amendments).  As of 1974, however, when I read through the 
case law in preparation for writing a student comment on the Act, it 
became obvious to me that the courts were treating Davis’s article 
(which he subsequently incorporated into the 1970 supplement to his 
 8. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991) (stating that “a 
noted scholar” supports the Court’s statutory interpretation); Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 
478 U.S. 788, 798 n.6 (1986) (“As one respected authority on administrative law has 
observed . . . .”); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.4 (1973) (citing to 
“[o]ne of the leading commentators on standing”); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 
183, 273–74 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that Davis “has been instrumental” 
in showing the validity of delegations where standards have been supplied).  Other 
examples are discussed in detail in the next section of this Essay. 
 9. A favorite example is a case reprinted in my casebook, in which the 
participating jurists argued at length about the proper interpretation of Davis’s work.  
Compare Cal. Hotel & Motel Ass’n v. Indus. Welfare Comm’n, 599 P.2d 31, 44–46 
(Cal. 1979) (Christian, J., concurring), with id. at 42 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 10. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2002); 
KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (3d ed. 
1994). 
 11. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
 12. Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 761 (1967). 
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treatise) as the principal scholarly resource on the subject. 
Although the main purpose of this Essay is to review Davis’s work 
from an academic standpoint, I should mention in passing some of the 
features of his treatise that made it a godsend for an administrative law 
practitioner (as I once was).  The chapters were arranged in a 
straightforward plan of organization, and each chapter was broken down 
into bite-size subsections.  Over the years, displaying a degree of 
productivity that most other scholars can only envy, Davis frequently 
updated the set with pocket parts, softbound supplements and, as needed, 
hardcover supplements.  Perhaps most importantly, he wrote with 
exceptional clarity.  In scanning much of Davis’s work in preparation for 
writing this Essay, I don’t think I found a single paragraph that was not 
easy to read.  His writing contained no academic jargon that an 
intelligent practitioner or jurist would find off-putting.  It was manifestly 
the work of someone who took pride in his prose.  Virtues such as these 
are sometimes overlooked by many of us in academia, who often have 
plenty of time on our hands, but I am sure they vastly improved the 
accessibility of the treatise for busy practitioners and judges. 
Needless to say, Davis did not have the field of administrative law to 
himself.  The most serious competitor to his treatise was Louis L. Jaffe’s 
Judicial Control of Administrative Action,13 published in 1965.  Most 
administrative law scholars would probably agree that, as between the 
two authors, Jaffe was the more subtle and profound thinker.14  Davis’s 
treatise had other comparative strengths, however.  In the first place, 
Jaffe’s book, essentially a compilation of essays, did not have the 
straightforward, systematic structure that, as I have just explained, made 
Davis’s treatise such an accessible reference work.  Furthermore, the 
limited scope of Jaffe’s purview appeared right in his title.  His book 
was mainly about the complex interplay of relationships between courts 
and agencies.  Davis’s much lengthier work covered not only that 
terrain, but also issues of administrative procedure such as adjudication 
and rulemaking, which Jaffe barely addressed.  Indeed, about half of the 
chapters in each edition of Davis’s treatise were devoted to procedure at 
the agency level.  Finally, Jaffe’s work was a powerful synthesis of 
themes that had been explored piecemeal in the administrative law 
 13. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965). 
 14. For a thoughtful assessment of Jaffe’s contributions to administrative law 
thinking, see Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe’s Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Underpinnings 
of Modern Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159 (1997). 




literature for many years.15  Davis’s work, in contrast, was more 
forward-looking and directed toward improvement of the administrative 
process.  I elaborate on his ideas for reform in the next section of this Essay. 
III.  THE REFORMER 
Davis rarely limited himself to neutrally describing the law.  He 
routinely encouraged progressive trends, by publicizing cases that he 
thought were well reasoned or had found good solutions to ongoing 
problems.  He also raised doubts about other trends, by criticizing decisions 
or commentaries that he thought had gone wrong or said something 
careless.  A talented debunker, he was not shy about telling the Supreme 
Court that it was dead wrong.16  In this fashion, his writings undoubtedly 
served to shape the law in countless small ways that would be difficult to 
track. 
On a wide range of topics, however, Davis’s reform agenda was deliberate, 
explicit, and vigorously argued, and this dimension of his scholarship 
invites particular attention here.  I will survey a variety of proposals that 
he made over the years, noting some successes, some failures, and some 
matters regarding which the law has not yet stabilized. 
A.  Adjudication 
If one had to choose a single familiar concept in American law that is 
routinely linked with the name of Kenneth Culp Davis, the choice 
almost inevitably would be the distinction between “adjudicative facts” 
and “legislative facts.”  Davis introduced this terminology in a 1942 
article.17  As he later summed up the difference between these two 
categories: 
   Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, 
when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the 
kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case.  Legislative facts do not usually 
concern the immediate parties but are the general facts which help the tribunal 
 15. As Judge Posner has observed, Jaffe’s book was the “summa theologica of [the 
postwar] era of administrative law scholarship.”  Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of 
Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 955 n.1 (1997). 
 16. One of my favorite examples of Davis’s scolding was his slashing attack on 
one lengthy section of Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), concluding with the remark 
that “[a]dministrative law would benefit if part V of the Ruiz opinion could be erased 
from the reports.”  Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Surprises in the Ruiz Case, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 823, 843 (1975).  Not coincidentally, I think, Ruiz has exerted little 
influence on the law subsequently. 
 17. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–16 (1942). 
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decide questions of law and policy and discretion.18
The core insight underlying the distinction was that the evidentiary 
processes of the courtroom are, generally speaking, better suited to 
resolution of adjudicative fact disputes than legislative fact disputes.  
The purpose of the distinction, Davis once wrote, “is to provide 
protection of trial procedure to named parties when disputed facts about 
them are to be found, and to allow freedom for tribunals to use facts that 
bear on law or policy without using such procedure.”19
The idea has had a variety of applications.  One of the most prominent 
has been its use in the law of judicial and official notice.  In that context, 
the thrust of Davis’s argument was that a court or agency can more 
easily justify noticing a fact that has not been substantiated in the trial 
record if the fact is legislative than if the fact is adjudicative.  This analysis 
received a measure of official recognition in Rule 201 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  The rule is limited, by its terms, to adjudicative 
facts, and the Advisory Committee’s notes accompanying the rule relied 
extensively on Davis’s work as the source of this limitation.20
As Davis liked to point out, notice of legislative facts has to be 
relatively unrestricted, because courts and agencies routinely rely on 
hundreds of assumptions about the world every day, even where these 
assumptions have not been tested through the adversary process.  
Among many illustrations he mentioned were the Supreme Court’s 
reliance on extrarecord facts about abortion in Roe v. Wade21 and about 
alcoholism as a disease in Powell v. Texas.22  The Court still does more 
or less the same thing, of course, and the practice is still generally taken 
for granted.  A very recent example that is familiar to many people was 
the Court’s reliance on amicus curiae briefs filed by corporate executives 
and retired military officers in Grutter v. Bollinger,23 attesting to the 
social benefits of a well-educated, racially diverse work force.  Despite 
the millions of disputatious words that have been written about that 
controversial case, I have seen no suggestions that the Court committed 
a procedural impropriety when it took account of the information 
 18. 2 TREATISE § 12:3, at 413. 
 19. 3 id. § 15:3, at 146. 
 20. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note. 
 21. 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (referring to various religions’ views as to when life 
begins). 
 22. 392 U.S. 514, 523–25 (1968); see 2 TREATISE § 12:6, at 425–26; 3 id. § 15:2, at 140. 
 23. 539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003). 




contained in these briefs, which of course had not been made part of the 
trial record.24
Davis’s position on official notice constituted one facet of a sustained 
campaign on his part to reduce the role of trial-type procedure in the 
administrative process.25  During his scholarly career, he saw administrative 
law evolve in ways that dramatically fulfilled this objective.  He was not 
the only proponent of this shift, of course, but he was one of its most 
sustained and vigorous champions.26  Probably the most important 
component of this revolution was the increased use of notice and 
comment rulemaking to narrow the range of issues that would need to be 
adjudicated at all.  This development is discussed more fully in the next 
section.  But even within the sphere of adjudication, Davis contributed to 
a trend toward streamlining.  He taught courts and agencies that a trial-
type hearing is unnecessary if no facts are in dispute,27 or if the only 
controversy is about broad legislative facts.28  He also promoted the 
development of summary judgment techniques at the agency level29 and 
sternly criticized the application of restrictive evidence rules in 
administrative proceedings.30
This is not to say that Davis was a proponent of streamlining adjudication 
in all circumstances.  In distinguishing between adjudicative facts and 
legislative facts, for example, he did not argue that serious testing of 
legislative facts should never be a feature of the adjudicative process.  
Rather, his position was that this testing, where needed, could usually be 
accomplished by means that fell short of a trial-type hearing.31  He 
suggested that the amount of procedural protection that a tribunal should 
 24. A less famous but quite interesting recent example of the Court’s use of 
judicial notice occurred in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002).  
This was a challenge to FCC regulations that required incumbent telephone companies to 
lease their facilities to new entrants.  The incumbents argued that the rules would 
discourage their investments in new facilities.  In rejecting this attack, the Court relied in 
part on the apparently undisputed fact that the rules had been in effect for years without 
suppressing investments.  Id. at 516–17.  The Court’s reliance on secondary sources for 
information that was not in the rulemaking record has troubled some administrative law 
scholars, but it strikes me as a defensible example of what Davis was talking about. 
 25. 3 TREATISE § 14:1. 
 26. Id. § 14:2, at 5, 7 (noting that “[t]he author of the 1958 Treatise raised his 
voice against the use of trial procedure to develop law or policy, but could find little or 
no support for his view either in law or literature”; however, the “tide began to turn 
during the 1970s, with the strong surge of rulemaking”). 
 27. 2 id. § 12:1. 
 28. 3 id. § 14:3. 
 29. Id. § 14:7. 
 30. Id. §§ 16:3, 16:4. 
 31. As he explained, Rule 201 does not say that courts (or by extension agencies) 
should always feel free to take notice of a legislative fact.  The rule simply says nothing 
about legislative facts.  Id. § 15:6.  Thus, the propriety of notice with respect to such 
facts remains open for case law development. 
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make available to those who wish to challenge a noticed fact should 
depend not only on whether the fact is adjudicative or legislative, but 
also on whether the fact is important to the ultimate decision and 
whether it seems to be disputable.32  For situations in which courts or 
agencies choose to resolve a controversy about legislative facts in the 
ordinary course of business (i.e., without “taking notice” of them), he 
advised them to rely on a similar balancing of several variables.33
Indeed, Davis had interesting ideas for augmenting the procedures 
used in adjudication—but these ideas have had less influence than his 
streamlining recommendations have.  In the second edition of his treatise, 
he propounded an ambitious thesis: that the appropriate procedures for a 
tribunal to use in resolving a given controversy should be essentially the 
same, regardless of whether the controversy arises in adjudication or in 
rulemaking.34  One striking corollary of this thesis was his claim that, 
when a court or agency intends to formulate new law or new policy 
during an adjudication, it should resort to a notice and comment 
procedure within the adjudication, in order to solicit input from 
nonparties.  Davis acknowledged that this suggestion was unsettling and 
probably unprecedented, but he invited courts and agencies to experiment 
with it.35  As far as I know, none has yet accepted the invitation.36  Davis 
predicted, however, that a time when the legal system will recognize the 
merit of his idea “will come, even though it now seems far away.”37
One of Davis’s last prominent proposals carried this unorthodox line 
of argument a step further.  In a 1986 lecture, he argued that “the law 
 32. Id. § 15:15; see also Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in 
Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 46–49 (elaborating on Davis’s 
analysis and concluding that the characterization of a fact as adjudicative or legislative in 
this context is “helpful, but not dispositive”). 
 33. 2 TREATISE § 12:8. 
 34. Id. § 12:5, at 423 (arguing that a written argument procedure should be used to 
resolve a question of law or policy, or a dispute over broad and general legislative fact, 
whereas trial procedure should be used to resolve a dispute over adjudicative facts or 
perhaps a narrow and specific dispute over legislative facts); see also 3 id. § 14:4 
(similar); 3 id. Preface, at xiii–xiv (highlighting this theme). 
 35. 3 id. § 14:6. 
 36. The judicial branch has no antipathy to notice and comment procedure as such.  
It does routinely use the functional equivalent of that procedure when it drafts revisions 
of its procedural rules—an overt rulemaking function.  The procedures are spelled out at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).  Presumably, 
then, the reason for the courts’ failure to take Davis’s advice is that they do not consider 
the procedure a suitable component of the adjudicative process. 
 37. 3 TREATISE § 15:9, at 177. 




made by judges seems to me clearly inferior to statutes and administrative 
rules in clarity, reliability, and freedom from conflict.”38  More 
particularly, he drew attention to the somewhat haphazard manner in 
which judges resolve issues of legislative fact that underlie their 
precedential rulings.  The briefs of parties and amici curiae can be 
helpful, but courts often fall back on their own informal research, or on 
outright speculation.  Accordingly, Davis called on Congress to provide 
a research service for the Supreme Court, comparable to the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), to which the Court could turn for specialized 
research assistance as needed.39  Needless to say, this has not happened.  
Nor do I think the Court would be likely to seek it.  Part of the Court’s 
mystique derives from the fact that it usually avoids being too overt 
about its lawmaking functions (even though it cannot really avoid 
exercising some such functions). 
Yet I would not write off Davis’s arguments as totally quixotic.  He 
himself pointed out that informal consultation between the Court and 
CRS had already occurred on an experimental basis.40  Moreover, 
discussions about the general problem that Davis was raising have 
continued to the present day.  Only about a year ago, Justice Breyer 
suggested in a speech that lower courts (but not the Supreme Court) 
should try occasionally appointing their own experts to help out in cases 
involving scientific or other technical subject matter.41
B.  Rulemaking 
One of Davis’s most frequently quoted remarks was his enthusiastic 
declaration that the “procedure of administrative rule making is one of 
the greatest inventions of modern government.”42  This pronouncement 
may or may not have been an overstatement, but a generation of 
administrators and judges seems to have been persuaded that Davis had 
something of a point.  During the 1960s and 1970s, agencies’ use of 
rulemaking underwent a remarkable expansion.43  It is not easy to say 
how much Davis was personally responsible for this trend.  Caseload 
pressures alone would have exerted considerable pressure in the same 
 38. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A 
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1986). 
 39. Id. at 15–17. 
 40. Id. at 18. 
 41. Stephen Breyer, ECONOMIC REASONING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 12 (AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 2004), available at http://www.aei.  
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=840 (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
 42. TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (1st ed. Supp. 1970). 
 43. Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal 
Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1147–48 (2001). 
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direction.44  At the least, however, Davis provided spirited advocacy and 
an intellectual framework that facilitated the advent of the rulemaking 
revolution. 
For one thing, he successfully promoted the contention that an agency 
may, as a general matter, use rulemaking to narrow the range of issues 
that are open to dispute in subsequent adjudication.45  That proposition 
may seem self-evident, at least to a modern audience.  In an earlier era, 
however, there was at least some doubt that an exercise of rulemaking 
authority under a given statutory scheme could supersede the right to a 
hearing, or to individualized consideration, conferred elsewhere in that 
same scheme.  Davis helped to persuade courts to decide, in one context 
after another, that various grants of rulemaking authority did have that 
effect.46  Davis also drew attention to the practical benefits of 
rulemaking, including its broad opportunities for public participation, its 
normal avoidance of retroactive effect, and its amenability to political 
oversight.47
One of the key features of the rulemaking revolution was the general 
acceptance of the notice and comment model of section 553 of the 
APA—the so-called “informal rulemaking” model—as the preferred 
procedural vehicle for agency rulemaking.  Here the Davis influence is 
relatively easy to detect, because courts often looked to his analysis of 
the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts to justify the 
comparative informality of rulemaking procedure.  Representative of 
this line of reasoning was the opinion of the D.C. Circuit in American 
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,48 an early leading case that encouraged the use of 
rulemaking.  Writing for the en banc D.C. Circuit, Judge Harold 
Leventhal noted: 
 The particular point most controverted by petitioners . . . involves what 
Professor Davis calls “legislative” rather than “adjudicative” facts.  It is the kind 
of issue involving expert opinions and forecasts, which cannot be decisively 
resolved by testimony.  It is the kind of issue where a month of experience will 
be worth a year of hearings.49
 44. Id. at 1148–49. 
 45. 2 TREATISE § 8:8; 3 id. § 14:5. 
 46. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991) (relying on Davis in 
reaching this conclusion); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 628 & n.11 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966) (en banc). 
 47. TREATISE § 6.15 (1st ed. Supp. 1970). 
 48. 359 F.2d at 624. 
 49. Id. at 633. 




Meanwhile, “formal rulemaking,” a procedure spelled out in the APA 
by which agencies could issue rules after conducting a trial-type hearing, 
fell into increasing disfavor.  This development was, of course, entirely 
consistent with Davis’s familiar thesis that trial-type procedures for the 
determination of issues of legislative fact should be discouraged.  The 
eclipse of formal rulemaking was definitively established in the early 
1970s by the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel Corp.50 and then United States v. Florida East Coast 
Railway Co.,51 both of which relied on Davis’s writings.52
Although Davis’s criticism of the use of procedures such as cross-
examination in rulemaking generated more than a little debate along the 
way,53 his position is no longer controversial.  Except in a handful of 
regulatory schemes in which statutes adopted prior to the rulemaking 
revolution require additional procedures, the notice and comment model 
has become standard.  To be sure, both regulated interests and 
beneficiary interests can still be heard to complain, from time to time, 
that one agency or another has promulgated a rule without taking 
sufficient pains to inquire into the factual premises underlying it.  These 
days, however, such complaints tend to take the form of urging the 
agencies to generate more (or better) impact studies, cost-benefit 
analyses, and risk assessments, rather than to engage in trial-type 
formalities.54
Indeed, only a few years after Florida East Coast, the Supreme Court 
 50. 406 U.S. 742 (1972). 
 51. 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
 52. Id. at 239; Allegheny-Ludlum, 406 U.S. at 757. 
 53. See William H. Allen, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1149, 1157–60 
(1980) (reviewing the second edition of Davis’s treatise); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Book 
Review, 70 YALE L.J. 1210, 1211–13 (1961) (reviewing the first edition of Davis’s 
treatise); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at 
Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 
485, 519–25 (1970) (defending cross-examination in rulemaking). 
 54. A heated debate over regulatory reform in Congress in 1995 neatly illustrates 
the evolution of administrative law thinking about rulemaking procedure.  A 
controversial bill, sponsored by Senator Robert Dole, would have imposed far-reaching 
requirements for cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment of expensive rules.  This bill 
was heavily promoted by business groups as a means of forcing agencies to use more 
rigorous methods in rulemaking proceedings.  In an earlier era, those same groups had 
been among the strongest proponents of trial-type hearing requirements in the 
rulemaking context.  Such requirements were, however, conspicuously absent from the 
Dole bill.  Rather, the bill merely invited agencies to augment public input in rulemaking 
by various devices, including allowance of “opportunities for oral presentation . . . at 
informal public hearings . . . .”  S. 343, 104th Cong. § 553(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1995) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 104-90, at 3 (1995).  Indeed, the bill went on to provide, 
in line with the Vermont Yankee case discussed immediately below, that an agency’s 
decision to use or not use any of the listed devices would not be subject to judicial 
review.  Id. § 553(c)(2)(B). 
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extended the trend toward streamlining even further than Davis could 
support.  In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,55 the Court unanimously declared that reviewing 
courts may not tell agencies what procedures to use in conducting 
rulemaking proceedings, except where the procedures are required by 
positive law, such as a statute or regulation.  The Court left room for 
judicial intervention in “extremely compelling circumstances,”56 but the 
severe tone of the opinion plainly implied that courts should be slow to 
discern any such circumstances.  In short, the Court seemed to insist that 
procedural choices are for Congress and the agencies themselves, not for 
the judiciary.  Davis refused to take Vermont Yankee at face value.57  He 
maintained that the Court’s words were “not a reliable guide to the 
future role of courts with respect to rulemaking procedure . . . .”58  
Indeed, he declared, the opinion was “largely one of those rare opinions 
in which a unanimous Supreme Court speaks with little or no 
authority,”59 because “the sure-footed, painstaking, and cautious 
opinions of courts of appeals during the 1970s on rulemaking procedure 
are highly responsible and generally admirable and cannot be abolished 
by sweeping and abrupt generalizations that seem on their face to be 
precipitate . . . .”60  He never reconciled himself to the Court’s rhetorical 
premises.61
Was Davis right to predict that Vermont Yankee would not be 
followed?  The answer depends on how one interprets the question.  The 
specific sort of judicially imposed procedural requirement that was at 
issue in Vermont Yankee—an obligation to supplement notice-and-
comment rulemaking with trial-type devices such as cross-
examination—is indeed defunct.  Davis approved of Judge Friendly’s 
suggestion that a court may properly order an agency to provide an 
opportunity for cross-examination if a party makes a concrete showing 
as to why that opportunity is necessary “to enable it to mount a more 
 55. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 56. Id. at 543. 
 57. See 1 TREATISE §§ 6:36–:37; 2 id. § 7:19; 3 id. § 14:10.  William H. Allen, an 
eminent Washington practitioner, has amusingly compared Davis’s reactions to the case 
to a melodrama, in which the judges of the D.C. Circuit were “heroes” and Vermont 
Yankee was the “villain.”  Allen, supra note 53, at 1160–63.  My more prosaic account 
here is quite similar in substance to Allen’s. 
 58. 1 TREATISE § 6:37, at 611. 
 59. Id. at 616. 
 60. Id. at 611. 
 61. See id. §§ 6:35–:39, at 216–21 (Supp. 1989). 




effective argument.”62  He anticipated that Friendly’s view “will 
continue to be the law unless and until the Supreme Court deals with it 
in specific terms.”63  That prediction was, however, mistaken.  No court 
has taken such a path since the 1970s. 
On the other hand, Davis accurately foresaw that some judicially 
created refinements to the rulemaking process would inevitably survive 
in a post-Vermont Yankee world, because the legal system could not 
function without them.  For example, agencies are still expected to 
compile a record during informal rulemaking proceedings, as a predicate 
for possible judicial review.  Vermont Yankee itself reaffirmed this 
requirement,64 although the notion that the APA itself contemplates 
review of a rule on an administrative record is historically inaccurate.65  
Similarly, the so-called Portland Cement doctrine, under which an 
agency must disclose critical technical information underlying a 
proposed rule,66 has survived Vermont Yankee.67  The nominal basis for 
its continued existence is that Portland Cement is an interpretation of the 
APA itself,68 but that interpretation is so far removed from the Act’s 
actual language as to make the line between “interpretation” and 
straightforward judicial common law very blurry indeed.69
In addition, judicial demands for detailed explanatory preambles to 
accompany agency rules have not abated during the years since Vermont 
Yankee.  Although these demands technically rest on the courts’ 
substantive review role, which is expressly authorized in the APA, they 
 62. 1 TREATISE § 6:20, at 543 (quoting Long Island R.R. Co. v. United States, 318 
F. Supp. 490, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)). 
 63. Id. § 6:37, at 616. 
 64. Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 549 (1978). 
 65. Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing 
Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act 
and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 754–56 (1975); Stephen F. 
Williams, “Hybrid Rulemaking” under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and 
Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 419–21 (1975). 
 66. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 378, 392–94 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). 
 67. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
Mortgage Investors Corp. v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  In each case, 
however, the agency rule was upheld, because the undisclosed information was not 
“critical.” 
 68. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684–85 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 69. Some recent cases limiting the interpretive rules exemption to the APA, 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000), might be placed in a similar category.  The courts have 
drifted so far away from the text of the exemption as to invite the charge that the spirit, if 
not the letter, of Vermont Yankee is being frustrated.  See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Distinguishing Legislative Rules From Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 566–
69 (2000) (faulting the D.C. Circuit’s “idiosyncratic interpretation of the APA”).  But cf. 
1 TREATISE § 6:31 (arguing that courts sometimes should require notice and comment for 
rules that fall within an exemption); id. § 6:1-1 (Supp. 1989) (same). 
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are in tension with Vermont Yankee, as Davis recognized.70  As a 
practical matter, the agency’s need to prepare a painstaking analysis of a 
rule in order to survive so-called “hard look” judicial review inevitably 
augments an agency’s obligations in creating the rule.  Indeed, this sort 
of pressure on the agencies is at best a mixed blessing, according to 
modern scholars who have lamented a trend toward “ossification” of the 
rulemaking process.  Their claim is that a combination of pressures on 
the rulemaking process, including the need to write explanations that can 
withstand hard look review, has made agencies increasingly reluctant—or 
even unable—to pursue their programs effectively through rulemaking.71  
It seems fair to say, however, that Davis never discerned such a 
tendency—or if he did, never acknowledged it as a problem.  His 
attitude toward hard look review was essentially benign.  To judge from 
the courts’ adherence to hard look techniques, the federal judiciary 
seems to agree with Davis as to the ongoing need for such controls.72
In short, Davis never lost his appreciation for the notion of courts and 
agencies as collaborators in the continuing evolution of rulemaking.  Ten 
years after his famous “greatest invention” remark, he wrote that, largely 
because of the courts’ continuing involvement, “[w]hat was one of the 
greatest inventions of modern government in 1970 has been vastly 
improved!”73  The collision between this attitude and the jurisprudential 
assumptions reflected in Vermont Yankee is a theme to which I will 
return at the end of this Essay. 
I should also mention one other rulemaking development that has been 
shaped by Davis’s writing.  In Ass’n of National Advertisers, Inc. (ANA) 
v. FTC,74 the D.C. Circuit declared that an agency official who 
participates in a rulemaking proceeding should not be held to the same 
strict standards of disqualification for prejudgment as would be enforced 
 70. TREATISE §§ 6:35–:39, at 216–17 (Supp. 1989). 
 71. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1412, 1419–20 (1992) (arguing that agencies 
“prepare for the worst-case scenario” on judicial review by devoting resources to 
compiling a record of their decision).  See generally William S. Jordan, III, Ossification 
Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency 
Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
393, 393–95 (2000) (surveying the literature). 
 72. For one prominent jurist’s skeptical response to the “ossification” critique, see 
Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 662–
63 (1997). 
 73. 1 TREATISE § 6:1, at 448. 
 74. 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 




in an adjudicative proceeding.  In the rulemaking context, the court said, 
a much looser test should apply: the official should be disqualified “only 
when there has been a clear and convincing showing that the agency 
member has an unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the 
disposition of the proceeding.”75  In explaining this lenient (if not utterly 
toothless) standard, the court harked back to Davis’s distinction between 
adjudicative and legislative facts.76  As the court argued, “legislative 
facts are crucial to the prediction of future events and to the evaluation 
of certain risks, both of which are inherent in administrative 
policymaking.”77  As part of the policymaking process, the court 
continued, an official must be able to consult freely and continuously 
with affected interests, voicing tentative opinions and soliciting their 
reactions to those opinions: 
   The [ideal] of a neutral and detached adjudicator is simply an inapposite role 
model for an administrator who must translate broad statutory commands into 
concrete social policies.  If an agency official is to be effective he must engage 
in debate and discussion about the policy matters before him. 
   . . . . 
   . . . That discussion necessarily involves the broad, general characterizations 
of reality that we label legislative fact.78
The ANA opinion has been controversial,79 but its legal principles have 
endured down to the present day.80  This is not the place to evaluate the 
controversy in detail.  For my purposes, the main significance of ANA is 
that it illustrates one way in which Davis’s famous distinction between 
adjudicative and legislative facts has proved useful outside the specific 
context of factfinding procedures, as judges have worked to liberate 
modern administrative policymaking from the constraints suggested by 
traditional norms of adjudication. 
 75. Id. at 1170. 
 76. Id. at 1161–62.  The court noted, with citations to eleven cases, that the 
distinction has been widely accepted.  Id. at 1162 n.20. 
 77. Id. at 1162. 
 78. Id. at 1168–70. 
 79. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Rulemaking “Due Process”: 
An Inconclusive Dialogue, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 215–37 (1981).  The court’s decision 
was more than a little audacious, because Congress had bestowed certain limited rights 
to cross-examination upon persons participating in the particular rulemaking function 
involved in that case (consumer protection rulemaking by the Federal Trade 
Commission).  Notwithstanding Congress’s partial endorsement of trial-type hearings in 
this context, the court insisted that the proceeding at hand was unambiguously 
rulemaking and triggered only the lenient disqualification standard that would otherwise 
apply to rulemaking.  ANA, 627 F.2d at 1159–61. 
 80. See, e.g., PLMRS Narrowband Corp. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (quoting and following ANA, 627 F.2d at 1170). 
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C.  Control of Discretion 
Not content with having established himself as the leading commentator 
on administrative law within the conventionally understood boundaries 
of that field, Davis ventured into largely unexplored territory in his 1969 
book Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry.81  The book had an 
ambitious goal: to explore the role of discretion throughout government, 
particularly in the executive branch, and to suggest ways in which its 
excesses could be curbed.  It was concerned primarily, though not 
exclusively, with highly informal decisions affecting individuals, at the 
least rule-constrained end of the spectrum of administrative activity.82  In 
line with this theme, Davis raised questions about the capacity of the 
legal system to circumscribe the discretion of governmental figures who 
operate largely outside the framework of standard administrative law 
constraints, “such as police, prosecutors, welfare agencies, selective 
service boards, parole boards, prison administrators, and the 
Immigration Service, where the usual quality of justice is relatively 
low.”83  He acknowledged that discretionary action is “indispensable for 
individualization of justice,”84 but he called on the legal system to ensure 
that discretion will be “properly confined, structured, and checked.”85
Discretionary Justice was daring, provocative, and probably extreme 
in some of its arguments.  For example, I suspect that few of us would 
subscribe to Davis’s condemnation of the “flagrantly lawless” discretion 
that police departments exercise when they generally refrain from 
enforcing criminal prohibitions against jaywalking and social gambling.86  
Nevertheless, the book was full of interesting ideas.  It quickly became, 
and has remained, a fruitful source of academic debate. 
When he succeeded Davis as author of the Administrative Law 
Treatise, Richard Pierce drastically shortened the amount of space that 
Davis had devoted to control of discretion.  The discussion in Davis’s 
second edition, incorporating much of the analysis that had earlier 
 81. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
(1969) (hereinafter DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE). 
 82. Id. at 5–6. 
 83. Id. at 216. 
 84. Id. at 25. 
 85. Id. at 26. 
 86. Id. at 84–86.  To be fair to Davis, he did acknowledge, three chapters later, that 
substantially full enforcement of a criminal code would be unthinkable in the absence of 
reform of existing criminal statutes.  Id. at 164 n.4. 




appeared in Discretionary Justice, extended over 148 pages.87  Pierce cut 
this coverage to twenty-three pages.88  To some extent, of course, this 
reduction in coverage must have reflected differences in the two authors’ 
respective intellectual tastes.  In all likelihood, however, Pierce’s 
decision also rested on a sound recognition that the development of the 
law in this area has fallen far short of what Davis had hoped. 
Among the book’s doctrinal suggestions, probably none has been 
more widely discussed than Davis’s proposal for a revised approach to 
the “non-delegation doctrine.”89  Davis presented his idea in rudimentary 
form in Discretionary Justice and elaborated on it in a law review article 
published at about the same time.90  His point of departure was an 
assertion that the classic version of the non-delegation doctrine has been 
almost a complete failure.  The doctrine purportedly requires that every 
statute that confers power on administrators must contain meaningful 
standards.  In practice, however, courts do not enforce this requirement.91  
Indeed, Davis continued, they have had good reasons not to do so, 
because legislators often have neither the time, nor the expertise, nor the 
level of consensus that the enactment of meaningful standards would 
require.92  Davis proposed, therefore, that the non-delegation doctrine 
should be reinterpreted, so that the task of articulating standards should 
rest with agencies rather than courts.  Ultimately, he thought, the 
doctrine should “grow into a requirement that administrators must strive 
to do as much as they reasonably can do to develop and to make known 
the needed confinements of discretionary power through standards, 
principles, and rules.”93
Davis’s idea that the applicability of the non-delegation doctrine 
should depend, at least in part, on the presence or absence of standards 
enunciated at the administrative level won some support in decisions of 
state courts94 and lower federal courts.95  No member of the Supreme 
 87. 2 TREATISE chs. 8–9. 
 88. 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 10, at §§ 17.1–.4.  Moreover, Pierce devoted 
part of this reduced discussion to analyzing ways in which courts have, in his view, gone 
too far in curtailing agencies’ discretion.  Id. § 17.1, at 98–101. 
 89. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE at 44–51, 58–59, 220–21.  Most writers today would 
omit the hyphen in “non-delegation,” but for purposes of this Essay I follow the Davis 
orthography.  According to a piece of folklore that I heard when I was on the staff of the 
University of Chicago Law Review, the editors of the Review once tried to alter the 
hyphenization in an article of Davis’s.  They relied on the Chicago Manual of Style, but 
Davis overruled them by pointing to a higher authority: the Administrative Law Treatise. 
 90. Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713 
(1969). 
 91. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE at 44–45. 
 92. Id. at 45–49. 
 93. Id. at 59 (emphasis omitted). 
 94. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees 
Ass’n, 839 P.2d 1080, 1086 n.12 (Alaska 1992); Minn. Energy & Econ. Dev. Auth. v. 
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Court ever embraced it, however, and recently, in Whitman v. American 
Trucking Ass’ns,96 the Court squarely rejected it.  Although the Court 
did not refer to Davis by name, the uncompromising tone of its opinion 
appears to confirm that the Davis theory has no future in federal law.  A 
related and more general point can also be made: federal courts have 
almost uniformly refused to direct agencies to structure their discretionary 
actions through rulemaking,97 notwithstanding calls by Davis98 and 
others for a more active supervisory stance.  The doctrinal foundations 
for this refusal were laid before Vermont Yankee,99 but that case has 
probably reinforced the courts’ resistance to issuing mandates of this 
kind.100
As I mentioned, however, the main focus of Discretionary Justice was 
on enclaves of government action in which discretion has been 
particularly unconstrained.  How much have the conditions that Davis 
spotlighted been alleviated?  My sense is that progress in taming 
discretion in these areas has been modest. 
For one thing, Davis was deeply concerned about the absence of 
checks on government decisions about who should be prosecuted or not 
prosecuted for various crimes.101  Today, however, broad prosecutorial 
discretion remains a reality.102  At the federal level, one can point to a 
number of guidelines, manuals, and the like, which are intended to 
structure decisionmaking by individual criminal prosecutors.  This is 
progress of a sort.  These guidance documents, however, are typically 
not mandatory, and they often are worded in highly general terms.103  
Printy, 351 N.W.2d 319, 350 n.13 (Minn. 1984). 
 95. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971); 
cf. Int’l Union UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1317–18 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 96. 531 U.S. 457, 477–78 (2001). 
 97. William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the 
Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 365–76 (2000) (collecting federal 
case law and citing none decided in the past twenty years that has required rulemaking). 
 98. 2 TREATISE §§ 7:24–:26; DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 57–58. 
 99. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290–92 (1974); SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947). 
 100. At the state level, however, the record is again more mixed.  See MICHAEL 
ASIMOW ET AL., STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 6.2.2 (2d ed. 1998) 
(surveying various states’ experiences with required rulemaking). 
 101. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE at 188–214. 
 102. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (upholding the 
government’s prosecutorial discretion in the context of prosecutions for draft evasion). 
 103. For a survey of these policies, see Michael Edmund O’Neill, When 
Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 221, 227–49 (2003). 




Thus, individual prosecutors retain broad freedom to decide which 
criminal cases to bring, constrained only occasionally by supervision 
from above.  Meanwhile, in the related sphere of regulatory enforcement, 
the situation might be said to have gotten worse from Davis’s point of 
view.  In its 1985 decision in Heckler v. Chaney,104 the Supreme Court 
laid down a general rule that exercises of administrative enforcement 
discretion are presumptively unreviewable.105  The body of case law that 
has grown up around Chaney is complex.  As a rough generalization, 
however, enforcement discretion is frequently reviewable when the 
challenger can point to statutory or other legal constraints impinging on 
the agency; but in the absence of such constraints (which is the usual 
situation), the agency’s discretionary choices are not reviewable, even 
for abuse of discretion.106
Another of Davis’s prominent proposals was that police departments 
should use rulemaking to structure their officers’ discretionary decisions 
about what criminal provisions to enforce, and against whom.  He was 
so taken with this idea that he published a followup book in 1975, Police 
Discretion, largely for the purpose of advocating it.107  Yet, although 
Davis’s idea has been the subject of much subsequent scholarly 
discussion, it has not really flourished.108  One reason may be that police 
rulemaking is out of step with certain recently emergent trends in 
criminal justice administration, which rest on the view that police 
discretion is not such a bad thing.  Among these trends are “community 
policing,” which contemplates creative adaptation to neighborhood 
conditions, and “order maintenance” policing, under which officers 
enforce laws against relatively minor crimes such as littering and public 
drunkenness in many—but not all—situations.  Both of these approaches 
require individual police officers to make numerous judgment calls.109  
 104. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 105. Id. at 832. 
 106. See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 
74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 752–62 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction 
After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1985). 
 107. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975). 
 108. See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1271–79 (2002).  For a slightly more upbeat appraisal, 
see Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice 
Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 14–
17 (2003). 
 109. For a lengthy discussion of the literature on these developments, see David 
Cole, Foreword—Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New 
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1060–61, 1063–70 (1999).  Cole 
himself is highly critical of the “new discretion.”  For a more positive assessment of the 
recent trends, see Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword—The Coming Crisis of 
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998).  See also Harold E. Pepinsky, Better 
Living Through Police Discretion, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (Autumn 1984) 
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To be sure, these broadly discretionary approaches can potentially coexist 
with measures that circumscribe discretion, including police rulemaking.110  
Nevertheless, it seems at least plausible to suppose that their salience has 
tended to erode the intellectual climate that once seemed likely to lead to 
substantial curbs on police discretion in accordance with Davis’s 
teachings. 
The case of sentencing discretion presents a very different story.  For 
about two decades, following the enactment of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984,111 the wide-open discretion once exercised by sentencing 
judges in the federal courts gave way to highly constrained 
decisionmaking under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Davis hailed 
the advent of these guidelines as a major advance in the taming of 
uncontrolled discretion.112  Other observers, however, would more likely 
have seen this development as an illustration of the adage “beware of 
getting what you ask for.”  The Guidelines came to be regarded, especially 
in numerous judicial chambers, as having constrained judges’ discretion 
too much.113  The complaints became especially fervent in the wake of 
Congress’s enactment in 2003 of the so-called Feeney Amendment, 
which tied judges’ hands even more tightly than before.114  To be sure, 
many of the objections to the stringent sentences that had been imposed 
under the Guidelines were directed primarily at mandatory minimum 
(arguing, in opposition to Davis’s views, that the proper solution is to augment officers’ 
accountability rather than to reduce their discretion). 
 110. Indeed, Kahan and Meares have argued that these two types of police reforms 
can be mutually reinforcing.  In their defense of Chicago’s antiloitering ordinance, which 
they lauded as a necessary tool to enable police to clear criminal street gangs from 
besieged neighborhoods, they emphasized that the city had adopted internal guidelines to 
structure police officers’ discretion in enforcing the ordinance.  Kahan & Meares, supra 
note 109, at 1183.  In that regard, their reasoning was entirely in sync with the Davis 
program.  When, however, the Supreme Court later struck down the ordinance as 
unconstitutionally vague, it brushed aside the city’s guidelines in a single paragraph, 
deeming them insufficient to cure the due process problems with the ordinance.  City of 
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 48–49, 63–64 (1999). 
 111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2000). 
 112. TREATISE § 8:1-1 (Supp. 1989). 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 964–67 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(Edwards, J., concurring); KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998) (making a vigorous attack on 
the guidelines). 
 114. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667–76; Stephanos Bibas, 
The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea 
Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295–97 (2004) (summarizing the amendment’s 
provisions). 




sentences prescribed by Congress, rather than at anything inherent in the 
nature of a relatively determinate sentencing system.115  Yet that distinction 
may be too facile.  It is scarcely surprising that, once a system for 
regularizing criminal sentences through publicly visible rules had been 
put into place, the system elicited legislative moves to bring those 
sentences into line with contemporary political pressures to crack down 
on crime.116  Perhaps more to the point, the diminution in sentencing 
judges’ discretion that was wrought by the guidelines was offset to a 
considerable degree by discretion exercised by prosecutors, who acquired 
more leverage with which to negotiate plea bargains to their liking than 
they had possessed before the guidelines existed.117  From that standpoint, 
the success of the guidelines experiment became questionable, even in 
relation to Davis’s own objective of curbing excessive discretion.118
Early this year, the Guidelines met their own day of judgment and 
barely escaped a death sentence.  In United States v. Booker,119 the Court 
held that the district courts’ use of the Guidelines to increase sentences 
on the basis of judicially determined facts was unconstitutional.120  
Although this holding rested on the right to jury trial and not on any 
overt policy critique of the Guidelines, it presumably was symptomatic 
of an underlying disenchantment with determinate sentencing schemes 
as they had come to be implemented.  Through creative statutory 
interpretation, a majority of the Court managed to avoid nullifying the 
Guidelines in their entirety.  Instead the Court ruled that district judges 
must treat them as merely advisory, subject to significant appellate 
review.121  How this directive will play out in practice remains to be 
 115. For example, Justice Kennedy lamented in a 2003 speech that “the guidelines 
were, and are, necessary [but] the compromise that led to the guidelines led also to an 
increase in the length of prison terms. . . .  In too many cases, mandatory minimum 
sentences are unwise and unjust.”  Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar 
Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus. 
gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2005). 
 116. Cf. TREATISE § 6.15, at 284–85 (1st ed. Supp. 1970) (observing that 
rulemaking facilitates legislative supervision of policymaking, whereas policymaking 
through adjudication is more likely to escape such influence). 
 117. See Harrington, 947 F.2d at 964–66 & nn.3–6 (Edwards, J., concurring); 
Bibas, supra note 114, at 301 (“More and more, judges have less power to deal and 
prosecutors have more.”); cf. Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three 
Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 557–61 (1992) (finding circumvention of 
guidelines by prosecutors in a minority of cases). 
 118. See Kennedy, supra note 115 (“[A] transfer of sentencing discretion from a 
judge to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, often not much older than the defendant, is 
misguided. . . .  Most of the sentencing discretion should be with the judge, not the 
prosecutors.”). 
 119. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
 120. Id. at 746–56 (Stevens, J.). 
 121. Id. at 764–68 (Breyer, J.). 
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seen, but the Booker decision obviously portends a major comeback for 
discretion in criminal sentencing. 
D.  Judicial Review 
Davis was one of our era’s most vigorous and effective proponents of 
liberal judicial review of administrative action.  I have already 
mentioned his support for “hard look” review of agency actions on the 
merits.  In this section I will focus on his contributions to the law that 
governs access to the courts.  Davis’s general attitude on this subject was 
reflected in a provocative passage in Discretionary Justice: 
   Among the government’s legal staffs are many specialists in the technicalities 
of such doctrines as ripeness, standing, forms of proceedings, government and 
officer immunity from liability, and unreviewability.  Year in and year out these 
government lawyers keep concocting intricacies within intricacies, trying to 
persuade courts to adopt them, and often succeeding. . . .  I agree that something 
in the nature of such doctrines is essential for an orderly system and to limit 
courts to tasks appropriate for them.  But from the standpoint of a good system 
of justice, the extreme complexity is much more harmful than it is helpful. 
   . . . . 
   If Congress, the President, or top legal officers were to direct that lawyers 
defending suits against the government are not to interpose technical defenses in 
cases that seem meritorious unless the policy behind the technical defense is 
important as applied, the total amount of uncorrected injustice from 
governmental action would unquestionably be drastically reduced, with no 
offsetting disadvantage.  The result would not be the payment of taxpayers’ 
money to undeserving plaintiffs.  The worst that could happen from a mistake of 
a government lawyer in failing to use a technical defense would be that a court 
would decide the case on its merits.122
To anyone who has become accustomed to the Rehnquist Court’s 
propensity to exalt these “technical defenses,” Davis’s expansive sentiments 
may sound positively startling. 
This is not to say that Davis favored broad rather than narrow 
opportunities for judicial review in all circumstances.  As the quotation 
indicates, he could see that some types of agency action are 
inappropriate for judicial supervision.  Indeed, this awareness gave rise 
to what I have elsewhere called “probably the longest—and possibly the 
most vitriolic—debate in the history of law reviews,”123 as Raoul Berger 
argued in a series of four articles that every administrative action must at 
least be judicially reviewable for abuse of discretion, and Davis 
 122. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE at 158, 161 (emphasis omitted). 
 123. Levin, supra note 106, at 695. 




responded in four more articles, criticizing Berger’s contention as too 
simplistic.124  Nevertheless, Davis had little regard for generalized judicial 
restraint notions.  He supported substantial relaxation of barriers to 
judicial review, and he exerted considerable influence in that direction. 
One example of that influence was his role in furthering the legislative 
abolition of sovereign immunity in suits for specific relief.125  Davis 
chaired an ABA committee that prevailed on Congress to enact this 
reform.126  To be sure, sovereign immunity had many other detractors,127 
but the importance of Davis’s advocacy is easy to document.  In addition 
to citing the ABA endorsement,128 the congressional committees that 
sponsored the measure relied directly on a letter that Davis had submitted 
for the legislative record.129  The same legislation also eliminated the 
amount in controversy requirement in federal question cases in which 
the United States was the defendant,130 and the congressional committees 
quoted Davis in support of this action as well.131
Within the sphere of judicially developed doctrine, the preeminent 
example of Davis’s impact on judicial review concerns the law of 
standing—i.e., the principles that determine which persons are entitled 
to go to court to challenge a given administrative action.  He argued in 
the 1958 edition of his treatise that the touchstone of standing should be 
whether the plaintiff has been “adversely affected in fact.”132  Too often, 
he thought, the courts had denied standing to people who had actually 
been injured by a government action, because they had been unable to 
allege an infringement of the requisite “legal right,” that is, to show that 
the kinds of injuries they had suffered or were likely to suffer were ones 
 124. See Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 
965, 966 n.9 (1969) (citing eight previous installments). 
 125. Pub. L. No. 94-574, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat. 2721) 6121 (codified in 
relevant part at 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (2000)). 
 126. 95 ABA ANN. REP. 342, 346 (1970) (identifying Davis as leading the ABA’s 
support for the legislation, in his capacity as Chairman of the Judicial Review Committee 
of the ABA Section of Administrative Law). 
 127. The proposal was cosponsored by the Administrative Conference of the United 
States (ACUS).  One also cannot overstate the significance of the fact that the Justice 
Department (led on this issue by Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia) supported 
the measure. 
 128. S. REP. No. 94-996, at 3 (1976); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 4 (1976), reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6121, 6124. 
 129. S. REP. No. 94-996, at 7, 10 n.33; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 8, 10 n.33.  For 
the text of the letter, see Kenneth Culp Davis, Revising the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 35, 47–48 (1977). 
 130. This measure predated by four years the elimination of the amount in 
controversy requirement for all federal question cases.  See Federal Question 
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)). 
 131. S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 16; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 17. 
 132. 3 TREATISE § 22.02, at 213 (1st ed. 1958). 
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that the courts should protect.133  A fairer and much simpler solution, he 
concluded, would be to recognize “the principle of elementary justice 
that one who is in fact hurt by illegal action should have a remedy.”134
In 1970, in the now-leading case of Ass’n of Data Processing Service 
Organizations v. Camp,135 the Court went a long way toward accepting 
Davis’s position.  In a move that scholars have traced directly to Davis’s 
writings,136 the Court read an “injury in fact” test into section 702 of the 
APA, associating that test with the “case or controversy” limitation 
required by Article III of the Constitution.137  Then, evidently having 
decided to split the difference between Davis’s view and the more 
restrictive views that had prevailed in the past, the Court went on to 
articulate a further requirement: the interest that the plaintiff seeks to 
protect must be “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”  In 
subsequent case law, this latter “zone of interests” test has been applied 
fairly leniently.138  “Injury in fact” is the usual focus of attention.  Thus, 
Davis’s victory in this area was incomplete, but he did set the basic 
trajectory of the Court’s standing doctrine.  What made his success 
especially remarkable is that the text of section 702 did not lend itself at 
all well to the construction that he induced the Court to place on it.139
 133. Id. § 22.04. 
 134. Id. § 22.02, at 211. 
 135. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
 136. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 256–58 
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” 
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 185–86 (1992). 
 137. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151–54. 
 138. Compare Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 
479, 492 (1998) (explaining that a class of plaintiffs can have standing even if Congress 
had no specific intent to benefit them; their interests need only be “arguably” protected 
by the legislation at issue), with Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers 
Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991) (the only case in which the Court has found that a plaintiff 
could not satisfy the zone of interests test). 
 139. The statutory language itself predicated standing on whether the plaintiff had 
suffered “legal wrong” or was adversely affected or aggrieved “within the meaning of a 
relevant statute.”  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).  Manifestly, it was intended to focus on legally 
defined rights.  Apart from his appeal to the “simple and natural proposition” that injury 
in fact should suffice for standing, 3 TREATISE § 22.18, at 291 (1st ed. 1958), Davis’s 
argument to the contrary relied primarily on congressional committee reports that had 
accompanied the APA.  See id. § 22.02.  Legislators from both Houses had explained 
section 702 as conferring a right of review upon “any person adversely affected in fact 
by agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute.”  ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 212 (1946) (House 
Judiciary Committee report) (emphasis added); id. at 276 (Senate Judiciary Committee 




Few would argue that Data Processing has brought stability or 
consensus to the law of standing, or resulted in the simplicity that Davis 
had forecast.  Davis himself became highly critical of the Court’s 
performance in subsequent standing cases.  He castigated the Court for 
inconsistency, result-oriented manipulation, and rhetorical digressions.140  
From his standpoint, the basic problem was that the Court was 
wandering off into detours; if it would adhere more faithfully to the 
injury in fact test, most of these ills could be cured.141  According to a 
number of thoughtful commentators, however, the real problem has been 
Data Processing itself.142  They argue that an “injury in fact” test cannot 
possibly provide a coherent approach to the analysis of standing, 
because one has to make value judgments to decide what counts as an 
“injury.”  Data Processing obscures those choices.143  Furthermore, it is 
argued, such value judgments should lie primarily within legislative 
control.  Yet, by linking the injury in fact concept to Article III, the 
Court’s approach has had the effect of stripping Congress of control over 
standing.  This implication was borne out by the Court’s controversial 
decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,144 which denied standing to 
environmentalists even though they had sued under a “citizen suit” 
provision that purported to confer standing on “any person.”145  Thus, 
despite the Court’s claims that the doctrine of standing is a restraint on 
the power of the judiciary, Data Processing has been criticized as an 
unwarranted judicial incursion on legislative supremacy.146  In short, the 
merits of the Data Processing revolution in standing doctrine are still 
report) (emphasis added).  Davis’s elevation of the committee reports over the enacted 
statutory text was criticized in his own day, JAFFE, supra note 13, at 528–30, and, of 
course, would be an even harder sell in ours, in light of the more skeptical attitude that 
today’s courts take toward legislative history.  Indeed, one basis for that attitude is a fear 
that interested factions will sprinkle the legislative record with unreliable, self-serving 
statements.  One of the earliest expressions of that fear singled out, as an example of 
such abuse, statements in the legislative history of the APA about what is now section 
702.  Alfred F. Conard, New Ways to Write Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 458, 461 & n.13 (1947). 
 140. 4 TREATISE §§ 24:1, 24:35. 
 141. See id. §§ 24:6, at 230, 24:35, at 337. 
 142. Criticisms of the opinion have at times been harsh.  See Richard B. Stewart, 
Standing for Solidarity, 88 YALE L.J. 1559, 1566, 1569 (1979) (book review) (viewing 
Data Processing as “an unredeemed disaster”); Sunstein, supra note 136, at 185 (calling 
Data Processing “a remarkably sloppy opinion”). 
 143. Fletcher, supra note 136, at 232–34; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, 
Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1154–60 (1993); Sunstein, 
supra note 136, at 188–92. 
 144. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 145. Stewart, supra note 142, at 1569–70 & n.47 (anticipating this result); Sunstein, 
supra note 136, at 188–89 (faulting Lujan). 
 146. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a 
Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1195–201 (1993). 
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deeply contested.147  The fact remains, however, that standing has become 
much more widely available today than it was when Davis began to call 
for change.  Despite the awkwardness of the manner in which the Court 
effected its reform, Davis deserves some credit for the expansion. 
Complementary to his contributions to the law of standing was 
Davis’s influence regarding the timing of judicial review of agency 
action.  His impact on the development of the ripeness doctrine is 
particularly evident.  Indeed, it is reported that Davis actually coined the 
term “ripeness” in administrative law; until he began writing about it in 
the 1950s, it had never appeared in any federal case on administrative 
law (except in descriptions of fruit).148  Of course, Davis did not 
fabricate the underlying concept out of nowhere.  He was reacting to a 
significant body of case law in which courts had rejected challenges to 
administrative action by asserting that the challenger had come to court 
too soon and must wait until a later stage in the administrative process 
before it could get review.  As in his writing on standing, Davis 
considered the case law too parsimonious about judicial review.  He saw 
some legitimate uses for the ripeness concept, such as where the issues 
tendered to the court were poorly defined or factually undeveloped, or 
where the plaintiff would suffer no substantial hardship from postponement 
of review.149  He argued, however, that courts had often turned challengers 
away due to a diffuse and, he thought, excessive concern for judicial 
restraint.  Too often, this translated into unnecessary dismissals on artificial 
grounds—such as where a statute or regulation had not actually been 
applied to the challenger through an enforceable order, even though it 
was causing hardship.150
The Court broke with these restrictive cases in Abbott Laboratories v. 
Gardner.151  That case allowed pharmaceutical manufacturers to go to 
court to challenge a recently promulgated drug labeling regulation, even 
though no enforcement proceedings had yet been initiated.  On a more 
 147. Recent cases have tended to soften the impact of Defenders of Wildlife.  See 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); FEC v. 
Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).  See generally William W. Buzbee, Standing and the 
Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247 (2001) (extending the debate in 
light of recent developments). 
 148. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 113, 166–67 & nn. 264–65 (1998). 
 149. 3 TREATISE §§ 21.02, 21.10, at 206 (1st ed. 1958). 
 150. Id. § 21.10, at 199–200. 
 151. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 




general level, Abbott made clear that ripeness should be evaluated on a 
functional basis, in terms of the fitness of the issue for immediate judicial 
consideration and the hardship that challengers would experience if review 
were postponed.152  The Court relied on the writings of Jaffe and Davis 
as its main sources of inspiration in reaching this formulation.153  In turn, 
Davis hailed the Court’s decision in Abbott for having repudiated the 
restrictive holdings of the past.154  Abbott has remained the dominant 
precedent defining the ripeness defense.155  To be sure, its approach to 
ripeness is inherently discretionary.  Holdings that particular challenges 
to agency action are unripe have by no means become an extinct 
species.156  But, precisely because so much does depend on discretion, 
the attitude with which the doctrine is implemented is critical.  Abbott’s 
policy is one of liberality, and Davis’s critique of the early case law 
surely contributed to it. 
In an interesting way, Davis’s impact on the law of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies presents a more mixed picture.  In Darby v. 
Cisneros,157 the Court construed the last sentence of section 704 of the 
APA.  That sentence provides that an agency action that is “otherwise 
final” is “final for purposes of this section,” and thus judicially reviewable 
immediately, regardless of whether the party seeking review has sought 
reconsideration or taken an internal agency appeal.  The Court concluded 
that the sentence also forecloses the courts from requiring exhaustion of 
administrative remedies in such cases.  Although this was by far the 
most natural reading of section 704, the lower courts had been ignoring 
the statute for years.  Davis had long deplored this judicial failure to 
follow the APA,158 and the Court highlighted his analysis in Darby.159  
On the other hand, in Patsy v. Board of Regents,160 the Court parted 
 152. Id. at 148–49. 
 153. Id. at 148 n.15; see Duffy, supra note 148, at 175.  The exact phrasing of the 
Court’s test appears to owe more to Jaffe than Davis, see JAFFE, supra note 13, at 410, 
423, but its substance harmonizes with the analysis in Davis’s 1958 treatise.  See, e.g., 3 
TREATISE § 21.10, at 206 (1st ed. 1958) (suggesting that, when substantial adverse effect 
on the plaintiff is neither present nor imminent, a finding of unripeness is normally 
proper, but the court should have discretion). 
 154. 4 TREATISE §§ 25:6, 25:16. 
 155. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001). 
 156. See, e.g., Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 
810–12 (2003); Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732–34 (1998); Toilet 
Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162–63 (1967) (holding, in a case decided the 
same day as Abbott, that association’s challenge was unripe because the issues presented 
might well be more reliably determined in an enforcement action, and association’s 
members would experience little hardship if review were postponed until that time). 
 157. 509 U.S. 137, 146–47 (1993). 
 158. 3 TREATISE § 20.08 (1st ed. 1958 & Supp. 1976). 
 159. Darby, 509 U.S. at 145. 
 160. 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). 
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company with Davis, ruling that a plaintiff who challenges the 
constitutionality of state administrative action by bringing a civil rights 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies 
first.  The Patsy holding reaffirmed prior case law that Davis had 
vigorously criticized.161  It may be no coincidence that, in each of these 
two cases, the Court opted for bright-line rules, as opposed to allowing 
courts to make ad hoc, discretionary decisions about whether to require 
exhaustion.  In other words, the Court was willing to take Davis’s advice 
only insofar as that advice was in tune with the formalist tendencies that 
had begun to characterize the Court’s jurisprudence by the early 1980s.  
As such, the two cases form part of a pattern that I will discuss in the 
concluding section of this Essay. 
IV.  THE PRAGMATIC OPTIMIST 
In this Essay, I have tried to present a candid assessment of Davis’s 
impact on administrative law.  It may have seemed that I have lingered 
too long on ideas that did not sell, but my purpose has not been to 
debunk.  How many of us could boast of a better track record than his?  
The shortfalls that I have mentioned say more about the extraordinary 
range of topics Davis addressed than about any shortage of inspiration or 
persuasive power on his part.  Moreover, I suspect that the lack of a 
better reception for some of his ideas is attributable, in part, to a shift in 
the intellectual climate within which administrative law has been 
evolving.  That supposition sets the stage for me to offer some 
concluding thoughts that may help to put Davis’s legacy into a larger 
perspective. 
In separate essays, Keith Werhan and Thomas Merrill have divided 
the modern history of administrative law into three periods, each 
dominated by a distinctive approach to judicial common lawmaking.162  
Werhan calls these three periods, respectively, the “traditional” era, the 
“interest-representation” era, and the “neoclassical” era.163  In the first 
era, immediately following the enactment of the APA in 1946, courts 
seemed to accept at face value one of the teachings of the “legal 
process” school of jurisprudence: agencies offer significant institutional 
 161. TREATISE § 20.01-1 (1st ed. Supp. 1976). 
 162. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1039 (1997); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 
ADMIN. L. REV. 567 (1992). 
 163. Werhan, supra note 162, at 568. 




advantages over other branches.  Accordingly, judicial decisions tended 
to emphasize the empowerment of administrative agencies, and removal 
of “needless procedural impediments” to their work,164 so that agencies 
would be equipped to pursue the public interest more effectively.165  The 
second era, commencing in the middle to late 1960s, was shaped by 
more skeptical views of agency power.  Fears about the bureaucracy’s 
tendencies toward insulation, unresponsiveness, and capture by special 
interests were prevalent during this period.  In Merrill’s words, courts 
seemed to act on a belief that, “by changing the procedural rules that 
govern agency decisionmaking and by engaging in more aggressive 
review of agency decisions[,] they could free agencies to open their 
doors—and their minds—to formerly unrepresented points of view . . . .”166  
The third era, beginning roughly in the early 1980s, has been marked by 
a general diminution in judicial common lawmaking itself, and a drift 
toward formalism.  As Merrill notes, “judicial innovations that would 
expand the authority of the courts at the expense of agencies have almost 
entirely disappeared.”167
Davis’s most active years as a scholar spanned, roughly speaking, the 
first two of these eras.  His contributions to the law on adjudication and 
rulemaking, as detailed above, can be linked to the first era, as they 
related primarily to the empowerment of agencies.168  His writings on 
control of discretion and on judicial review have a closer relationship to 
the second era, as they were concerned with the establishment of firmer 
controls over agencies.169  In turn, Merrill’s and Werhan’s accounts of 
the third era may help to explain why the courts, in recent years, have 
seemed wary of embracing some of Davis’s ideas. 
Davis was a product of the legal process school,170 with a strong dose 
 164. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1049. 
 165. See id. at 1041, 1048–50; Werhan, supra note 162, at 576–83. 
 166. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1043; see id. at 1050–52; Werhan, supra note 162, 
at 583–90. 
 167. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1041; see id. at 1053–55; Werhan, supra note 162, 
at 590–607; see also Duffy, supra note 148, at 212–13 (arguing that the era of common 
lawmaking in administrative law, as fostered by Davis and others, has passed). 
 168. See Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law 
and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1408–09 
(2000) (discussing how Davis’s writings in the 1950s argued for a pluralist vision of 
administrative agencies’ legitimacy, contemplating only a limited role for judicial 
supervision). 
 169. Id. at 1414–15 (explaining how, as interest group pluralism declined in the 
mid-1960s and thereafter, Davis became a proponent of broader standing principles and 
of closer judicial oversight of agencies); Merrill, supra note 162, at 1062–63 (noting 
Davis’s call in Discretionary Justice for stronger legal standards to structure agency 
discretion, and characterizing the book’s strident tone as an embodiment of the “agitated 
and activist” mood of the 1960s). 
 170. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal 
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of legal realism mixed in.171  He had little if any use for the formalist 
tendencies and rhetoric of judicial restraint that have come to be 
characteristic of our day.  Pragmatism, purposive interpretation, and 
respect for judicial creativity were pillars of his intellectual framework.172  
He made his perspective abundantly clear in what appears to have been 
his final scholarly appearance in the law reviews—the transcript of a 
conference in 1990 sponsored by the Federalist Society.173  With 
characteristic bluntness and audacity, Davis took issue with a statement 
in the conference brochure, in which the Society had declared that “it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law 
is, and not what it should be.”  To Davis, this was simply nonsense: 
A main reason I accepted the invitation is to try to persuade the Society that in 
the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say both what the law is, 
and what it should be. 
   My position is entirely conservative; it is in full agreement with judicial 
practice that has long been uniform and deeply established.  Anglo-American 
courts for centuries have been creating new law to answer new questions, re-
examining and sometimes changing initial answers in light of later and better 
understanding, responding to new legislative facts that affect the lawmaking, 
and reconsidering and sometimes changing established law in the light of later 
or better understanding. 
   . . . . 
   After spending half a century studying administrative law, I believe that many 
of the most valuable portions of administrative law are wholly the product of 
judicial creativity.  Nearly all of today’s administrative law has been created 
during the past half century.  If the Federalist Society’s opposition to judicial 
creativity had prevailed, the most valuable portions of today’s administrative 
law could not have come into existence.174
Flowing as they did from these jurisprudential premises, many of 
Davis’s recommendations, including several that I have discussed above, 
were unlikely candidates for incorporation into a “neoclassical” body of 
administrative law.  For example, I have already referred to his harsh critique 
of Vermont Yankee.175  He considered that case’s disavowal of judicially 
Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2049 & n.111 (1994). 
 171. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 19, 121, 124–
27 (2000) (associating Davis with the legal realists’ belief in the inevitability and 
necessity of administrative governance, as part of the legacy of the New Deal). 
 172. Duffy, supra note 148, at 119, 135–36. 
 173. Symposium, The Presidency and Congress: Constitutionally Separated and 
Shared Powers: Panel V, The Role of the Courts in Separation of Powers Disputes, 68 
WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 676–81 (1990) (remarks of Kenneth Culp Davis). 
 174. Id. at 676–77. 
 175. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 




prescribed procedures in rulemaking to be unworkable and contrary to 
precedent and the intent of the APA.  But the Court was deaf to this 
critique.  Indeed, in 1990 the Court indicated that Vermont Yankee principles 
apply to adjudication as well as to rulemaking.176  The Court reached this 
decision in a surprisingly casual fashion, and despite ample room to 
doubt that the stated reasoning of Vermont Yankee was applicable.177  
The main explanation for this extension had to be the Court’s aversion to 
unconstrained judicial activism in the realm of administrative procedure. 
To take another salient example, Davis was predictably dismayed by 
the Court’s decision in 1984 in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.178  Chevron set forth (or at least appeared to have 
set forth) an across-the-board requirement of substantial deference to 
agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they administer.  Davis’s own 
thinking about the scope of judicial review of agency action was free-
form and pragmatic.  He found the verbiage of the case law unhelpful 
and thought the real law in this area could be reduced to a single 
generalization: “Courts usually substitute judgment on the kind of 
questions of law that are within their special competence, but on other 
questions they limit themselves to deciding reasonableness; they do not 
clarify the meaning of reasonableness but retain full discretion in each 
case to stretch it in either direction.”179  Post-Chevron, he declared that 
the deferential attitude prescribed in that case was an outright abdication 
of the judicial task of deciding relevant questions of law.180
The divergence between Davis’s views and those of modern courts 
reflects not only competing jurisprudential theories but also contrasting 
attitudes.  Merrill and Werhan suggest, as do others,181 that the formalism of 
the neoclassical age is largely attributable to burgeoning cynicism about 
government as a whole, including the courts themselves.182  “For whatever 
reason,” says Merrill, “the recent era has been characterized by widespread 
pessimism about the capacity of any governmental institution to achieve 
 176. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653–56 (1990). 
 177. In Vermont Yankee the Court had been able to argue, with some credibility, 
that Congress itself had determined the appropriate degree of formality for rulemaking.  
See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
523, 547 (1978) (noting that section 553 of the APA “enacted ‘a formula upon which 
opposing social and political forces have come to rest’”) (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. 
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950)).  The APA contains no analogous template for 
informal adjudication.  It contemplates that, except in “formal” cases, procedures in 
adjudicative cases will be determined outside the APA itself. 
 178. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see TREATISE ch. 29 (Supp. 1989). 
 179. 5 TREATISE § 29:1, at 332 (emphasis omitted). 
 180. TREATISE § 29:16-1 to 29:16-4 (Supp. 1989). 
 181. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 23–25 (1997). 
 182. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1044, 1054; Werhan, supra note 162, at 608, 615–16. 
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results that will promote the public interest.  In effect, capture theory’s 
pessimism about the performance of administrative agencies has been 
generalized to include all political institutions.”183  Thus, modern doctrine 
proceeds from an unarticulated premise that, if both courts and agencies 
are unreliable champions of the public interest, or susceptible to manipulation 
by organized groups, the rules of the game might as well be as simple 
and mechanical as possible.184
Davis, however, was no cynic.  His writing continually suggested that 
matters could be handled satisfactorily, if other people would only listen 
to good advice.  His scholarship is full of solutions—some probably farfetched, 
many extremely sensible—but no fatalism or resignation.  He was not a 
partisan of either courts or agencies vis-à-vis each other, but he was quite 
optimistic about what they could achieve together if properly advised. 
For many of us who learned administrative law under his tutelage, or 
have found guidance in his writing, that optimism and idealism will 
remain an inspiration.  From this standpoint, a rereading of generous 
portions of Davis’s work is highly recommended.  It can be a great tonic.  
It is not only intellectually stimulating, but also spiritually bracing.  In 
today’s environment, we see many examples of partisan conflict, the 
breakdown of traditional boundaries and norms, and diminished trust in 
the state.  Supporters of administrative governance who find themselves 
jaded or discouraged by all this should not forget where at least one 





 183. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1053.  One might ask whether the adoption of some 
of Davis’s teachings itself contributed to this reaction.  Probably the strongest case along 
these lines would focus on his role in encouraging broader judicial review, especially 
broader standing, with its attendant empowerment of public interest groups.  Conceivably, 
too, agencies’ broader use of rulemaking, as encouraged by Davis and others, has had 
some fallout by making governmental requirements more forceful and salient.  Cf. Jim 
Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: A Rulemaking Revolution or 
Counter-Revolution?, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 345 (1997) (discussing a “counter-revolution” 
in Florida, leading to imposition of heavy-handed curbs on the rulemaking process, soon 
after that state adopted a statute that required agencies to favor rulemaking where 
feasible and practicable).  On the whole, however, my sense is that the pessimism about 
judicial creativity in modern legal thinking has far less to do with these influences than 
with ideological struggles rooted primarily in constitutional law.  See Werhan, supra 
note 162, at 620. 
 184. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1044. 
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